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Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega On Peace
Talks, Contra Prospects, Relations With U.S.
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Wednesday, July 20, 1988
[Summarized below are highlights from a recent interview with Nicaraguan Defense Minister
Humberto Ortega, by Cuban news agency Prensa Latina (broadcast on July 18-19). The interview
took place at the Sandinista Army headquarters, located in dictator Anastasio Somoza's former
home in Managua.] PL: What is your perspective on the contras' new conditions which the
Nicaraguan government must fulfill before the peace talks are resumed? [Three of these
"conditions" are that President Daniel Ortega must attend the next round of talks; that the talks take
place outside of Nicaragua; and, that the president's four Central American counterparts endorse all
agreements emerging from the negotiations.] Ortega: It is clear the contras are completely ignoring
the Sapoa accords signed in late March. They are trying to put an end to it because it promotes
peace and the disarmament of their forces. They want to get rid of Sapoa to launch different
negotiations. Our position is that Sapoa...must not be dismantled. What kind of confidence could we
have in a new agreement if the contras are unable to follow through on the one they've just signed?
In demanding that Daniel Ortega attend a meeting in another country, they are in fact violating
the Esquipulas accords [signed by the five Central American presidents in August, 1987], because
according to that document, each signatory nation must assume its own undertakings. There is no
ground for moving Nicaraguan negotiations to another country... PL: What is the FSLN's response
to the contra requests? Ortega: The government continues to support political negotiations, a
negotiated solution based on the contents of the Esquipulas accord. In brief, each government
must call for the end of hostilities. In the case of Nicaragua, not only did we issue calls, but we
also reached an agreement to arrange for a ceasefire. We went beyond Esquipulas, and signed an
agreement with the contras that we are fulfilling. But now the gringos are trying to destroy it, since
it doesn't suit them. certain sectors of the Democrat Party and the US public, and others, because
they are violating the Sapoa accords. They are also ignoring the verification commission set up in
Sapoa...Because the aid approved by the US Congress for Nicaraguan children and humanitarian
aid for the contras was in keeping with the Sapoa accord, the Nicaraguan government will continue
to push negotiations and other arrangements outlined in that accord. We are not going to start all
over again on a new basis for negotiations, when perfectly sound agreements already exist between
the government and the contras on the one hand, and the five Central American presidents on
the other. presidents "endorse" agreements emerging from negotiations with the Nicaraguan
government is probably linked to US Secretary of State George Shultz's recent visit to the region
(excepting Nicaragua). The contras say that the presidents should be like judges. Surely the gringos
told the contras to deliver this demand, and forget about everything else. The US is preparing a trap
for Nicaragua, to compromise and corner us. realize that the contra has failed, that it is a bankrupt
endeavor and that it has no future, even with heavy financial backing. Recognition of such political
errors will make it difficult to resume debate in the Congress for providing the contras with military
aid because it is clear that Nicaragua is trying to sustain the Sapoa negotiating process while the
contras are not. Sapoa has become a focal point for all that is happening in political and military
areas, as well as US-Nicaragua relations. This is happening at a very important moment for the
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Nicaraguan revolution. Imperialism, through mercenary forces what we call the mercenary step has
tried to create all manner of conditions to destroy the Sandinista popular revolution. This mercenary
step has been the spearhead of a broader strategy...that the US would implement in the event that
conditions were favorable for a larger-scale attack through Honduras. Reagan has set out to destroy
the revolution, and the lowest-cost mechanism to do so would be through the contras. However,
if the contra option inside Nicaragua fails, the Reaganites could escalate the aggression via border
conflicts between Nicaragua and Honduras... PL: Do you think the US Congress would support an
action of this type under a president whose term has nearly expired? Ortega: Conditions are not
favorable for unleashing such a conflict, considering US relations with other countries, and domestic
factors such as protests by certain sectors of the US public and some powerful groups within the
Democratic Party. But in view of the reactionary, adventurous nature of the present administration,
we cannot trust Washington... PL: How does the Sandinista Front envisage Nicaragua's future
in the event of a Democrat presidential victory in the US? Ortega: If the liberal, pragmatic and
realistic Democrats adopt conduct observed thus far, relations between the US and Nicaragua
would improve to a degree that may permit achieving what the revolution has always sought: a
stable, respectful relationship...The US is a very powerful country, but that does mean it is entitled
to subjugate small countries like ours. for our country...The war with the contras would have
finished long ago were it not for US support. Fidel Castro said to us that this war has been a largescale Giron. [In 1961, Cuba defeated an invasion sponsored by the US on the country's southern
coast, Playa Giron, Bay of Pigs.] We've had to stand up against a seven-year Giron that has cost us
thousands of deaths and billions of dollars in destruction. Recently, the Democrats have acted in
an intelligent, positive, civilized, practical fashion in regard to the war-like extremist policy of the
Reaganites. Many analysts predict that Dukakis will win the election. We hope those Democrats will
continue to work for conditions promoting coexistence, notwithstanding a number of problems that
do not need to be settled via military confrontation. PL: Isn't it possible that a long-term ideological
struggle may prove to be more difficult than war? Ortega: Now the problem is the war. People are
dying, young people are getting killed. The rest remains to be seen. I think that people will deal
with whatever follows upon actual warfare...Before the revolution there was a slick political and
ideological veil prevailing in Nicaragua, yet we were able to take power after more than a century
of domination by the United States, the reactionary bourgeoisie, the reactionary clergy in brief, the
right. The right completely dominated people's thinking, through the propagation of ignorance,
and their control of military and economic power. If in those conditions, our people did not lose
their sense of reality and their political and ideological convictions, how could they lose their
vision after nine years of revolution? I think that Nicaraguans would prefer the alleged danger of
ideological confrontation to the death of an infant or a 16-year-old son...to young people defending
their country instead of studying. In practice, the revolutionary ideological convictions of many
people have been strengthened in the process of withstanding the war and the economic crisis we
find ourselves in. That has been possible because there is an awareness of foreign intervention...and
confidence in the future. In the struggle against imperialism and armed aggression, a great political
force, a great sense of awareness, has been generated. PL: Could you comment on the economic
costs of the war in Nicaragua? Ortega: The threat of US aggression and the mercenary war have
obligated us to design a voluminous defensive force. In addition to the army, we have managed to
organize hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans who are ready to defend themselves with pistols,
knives, rifles and traps. In the strategy of the people's war we have developed, the backbone of the
organized militias and reserves is the army. The cost of being prepared for the possibility of a largerscale aggression means we must earmark sizeable resources for training, uniforms, mobilization
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and so forth. This hurts the economy because it absorbs already extremely limited resources that
should be used for other things. We must deploy large numbers of reserve and local militias to
guard bridges, electricity installations, farm cooperatives, schools. In other words, the budget must
be used to finance military operations instead of schools, hospitals and childcare centers. Our
schools and hospitals are functioning in truly wretched conditions... more difficult to measure. For
instance, when the contras blow up 10 electricity poles or a sub-station, production stops due to the
lack of electricity, the mines are damaged when the pumps stop working...Whenever the contras
destroy or damage bridges, roads, electrical installations, water sources, and the like, this has effects
on output and productivity. There are transportation bottlenecks, slowdowns...Agricultural and
forestry production become more costly for a variety of reasons caused by contra attacks, threats,
presence. In the case of timber, getting it out of the forest areas literally exacts heavy costs in blood.
The mines are virtually shut down, and vast stretches of precious woods on the Atlantic coast have
been destroyed by fire. All of this becomes a logistical nightmare: we can't station a soldier at all
potential targets... PL: What are your expectations for the future after the Reagan administration?
Ortega: Each day, each week provides more proof of the failure of the contra war as an option. There
are more divisions, more defections...By the end of the year the contras may be totally dismantled,
at least in terms of political leadership. Just which contra leaders would the Democrats assist?
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro? Bermudez? Cesar or Calero? about the danger of Nicaragua's alleged
excessive arms buildup in order to depict us as a threat to the democratic governments of Central
America. The problem will no longer be the contras...They are no longer a real option for toppling
this government, either politically or militarily. So, the US reactionaries and the contras will work
toward joint action by the Central Americans against Nicaragua in support of a policy of blockade,
or for negotiations to suit their interests. They would like to get us into a trap to force us to negotiate
with a bankrupt enterprise... We will act as we always have done...If the US continues trying to force
us into disadvantageous negotiations, they are going to have to intervene because Nicaragua will
not bow to such pressure. They have the strength, they have all the resources, but the domestic
political conditions in the US and in Latin America are not the best for such a move, nor are they
supportive in the world at large. The US is not really in a position to invade Nicaragua. PL: Can
this situation be interpreted as a Sandinista victory? Ortega: I believe so...But, I'm not ruling out
an intervention. We have to be prepared for just that because an enemy like Reagan is capable of
anything. But among the US public, there is a great deal of opposition to such an intervention...
PL: Could you discuss details of the negotiations with the contras? Ortega: The contras represent
a coalition, not a single line or leadership. They acknowledged as much in the past talks. They are
against us, but each sector in this coalition has its own political interests. Cesar heads the Southern
Opposition Bloc (BOS), and has hiw own views. Azucena Ferrey is a Social Christian. Adolfo Calero
is a businessperson with a gringo mentality and political ambitions. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro says
he's a democrat and has his own liberal nationalist political project. Enrique Bermudez...thinks like a
North American, like a Rambo or Green Beret, and he is surrounded by what's left of the Somocista
National Guard...There is no homogenous leadership in political and ideological terms. They
split easily. They all have their own particular interests, and they all want to play lead roles. make
demands as if you represented a major force, when in point of fact, you've already lost the war. You
ought to be thanking us for sitting down with you, because you're an illegal and illegitimate force.
You're a bunch of terrorists who are utterly dependent on the United States. You're lost." I asked
Bermudez: "Where are your forces? Here in Managua? Out there behind those windows? Are they
capturing Matagalpa or Jinotega? What village have you people captured? "Tell me that, will you?
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You've done nothing, and here you are demanding power." They said nothing in response, because
they couldn't argue with the truth.

-- End --
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